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ABSTRACT 
This study addresses the effects of monopolistic firms' location and guarantee time limit on pricing for 
goods requiring high maintenance expenditure, such as elevators, televisions and computers. A spatial 
maintenance model of two stages within a guaranteed time limit is outlined in this paper. Based on 
this model, location, maintenance commitment and pricing are all characterized under a monopoly 
situation. This paper outlines the optimal price and location for the monopolist. The effects of guaran-
tee time limit on price are discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Maintenance is legally required for many goods, such as elevators, televisions and computers. 
With a suitable guarantee time limit, a firm can improve profits and significantly encourage consump-
tion. Maintenance has been extensively discussed in the management field and economics (Estelami, 
Grewal and Roggeveen, 2007; Indounas, 2008; Jin and Kato, 2006; Utaka, 2006). Most research has 
found a positive relationship between service guarantee and quality, while some research has ques-
tioned this relationship (Hays and Hill, 2006) and references therein. A recent paper discussed the 
price-matching guarantees (PMGs) of retailers and the potential negative effects on consumer percep-
tions (Estelami, Grewal and Roggeveen, 2007). Research in economics suggests that PMGs can sup-
port a mechanism of collusion among the retailers (Corts, 1997; Chen, 1995). The presence of PMGs 
by one retailer provides a disincentive to other retailers to lower their prices, because retailers’ price 
will be matched by the PMG-offering retailer. Utaka (2006) established a multi-stage model to discuss 
warranties of durable goods in economics and made some interesting conclusions. 
This paper focuses on the maintenance for durable goods with shipping costs. We hope to ad-
dress the effects of transportation cost on the market under a monopoly and to develop a theory of 
warranties of durable goods with spatial competitions, since the shipping costs have significant effects 
on the price and location of firms (Ramcharan, 2009). Based on spatial competitions, optimal pricing 
strategies and location are addressed and captured. The effects of guarantee time limit on price and 
profits are characterized. Furthermore, our conclusions are useful for pricing durable goods in second 
hand markets. There is a vast literature about spatial competitions. Hotelling (1929) initially proposed 
a model which gives an excellent framework for research into spatial competitions. Vogel (2008) re-
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cently addressed product differentiations when spatial competitions were introduced. Loginova and 
Wang (2009) developed customization with spatial competition and derived some interesting results. 
Larralde, Stehlé and Jensen (2009) gave explicit solutions to a multi-dimensional Hotelling model 
with quadratic transportation costs. The Cournot equilibrium was recently addressed in a Hotelling 
model by Valverde and Escalona (2010). Heywood and Ye (2009) developed the theory of mixed oli-
gopoly in spatial competitions and derived some interesting results about social welfare. Dixon (2010) 
discussed city planners and architects observing a variety of social phenomena. Chakravorty et al. 
(2008) investigated energy prices in a linear city. Nie (2010) developed a theory of technology spil-
lover under spatial competitions. 
Game theory approaches are employed in this work (Tirole, 1988; Nie, 2009; Anton and Das 
Varma, 2005; Dudine, Hendle, Lizzeri, 2006; Chen and Zhang, 2009). This paper is organized as fol-
lows: The model is outlined and discussed in Section 2. Analysis and main results are presented in 
Section 3. Optimal price and location are also outlined in Section 3. Some concluding remarks are 
provided in the final section. 
2. THE MODEL 
We assume that there is a unique producer in some industry and the monopoly firm faces demand 
for a corresponding good that requires high expenditure to maintain in the linear city [0,1] . We further 
assume that the guarantee time period is exactly T . Namely, it is free to maintain this product in time 
T  after the consumer buys it. All consumers are uniformly distributed in the linear city. If the guaran-
tee time limit expires, the consumer then has to pay maintenance costs. As an extreme case, 0T =  is 
the case without a guarantee commitment. 
The following notations are utilized in this paper:  
p and q denote the price and quantity, respectively, of the good requiring high maintenance ex-
penditures for the monopoly firm. 
We assume that the probability to be maintained for each good observes an exponential distribu-
tion. Namely, the probability to repair at t  is ( , ) tt e λϕ λ λ −= for 0t ≥ , where λ is a constant dependent 
on the quality of the good and 1λ−  is the average life expectancy of the corresponding good. The para-
meter λ depends on the technique of the monopoly firm. We further assume that 10 T λ−≤ ≤ such that 
the guarantee time limit is shorter than the average life expectancy. Therefore, the probability to repair 




( , ) 1
t tt dt e λϕ λ −= −∫ . The information about the product is known to 
both the producer and the consumers. The life cycle of many types of electronic products and other 
durable goods observes this kind of 
The firm locates at 
distribution. 
1 [0,1]z ∈  for sale and at 2 [0,1]z ∈  for maintenance. The model is composed of 
two stages. In the first stage, the firm locates both for sale and for maintenance. In the second stage, 
the firm prices based on the following model. 
The marginal cost incurred by production for each product is 0c , and c denotes the marginal cost to 
repair each time. We assume that the cost to repair the corresponding goods of quantity s each time is 
( )c s cs= . tc is a constant and linear transportation cost incurred, which is different from that in a 
recent paper (Larralde, Stehlé and Jensen, 2009). Furthermore, the incurred transportation cost is 
wholly shouldered by consumers. We always assume that repairing the corresponding goods is cheap-
er than buying new goods. The quasi-linear consumer utility function, ( , , )u q T x , in the consumption 
of good q with location at [0,1]x∈  is always employed. We further assume that u is continuously 
differentiable. The consumer model is presented as follows: Given any price p and guarantee time 
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limitT , the consumer location at [0,1]x∈  chooses d  to maximize utility, ( , , )d d p T x= . The follow-




1max ( , , ) ( , ) ( , )
2 t tTd
u d T x Ad d dp cd t dt c d x z c d t dt x z
λ λ
ϕ λ ϕ λ
− −
= − − − − − − −∫ ∫    (1) 




Ad d− represents the utility of consumer lying at [0,1]x∈ to consumer goods d . dp  is the 








∫  stands for the expenditure to repair in the expected life 
cycle of goods d . 1tc d x z−  represents the transportation cost to buy goods of quantity d . The term 
1
20




−∫  indicates the transportation cost to repair goods of quantity d . ( , , )d p T x is 
the static demand function associated with (1). Denote the total demand 
1
0
( , ) ( , , )D p T d p T x d x= ∫ . 
Given the price and guarantee time limit, the monopoly firm aims to maximize its objective function 
or corresponding profits: 
00
max ( ) ( , ) .
T
p
p pq cq t dt c qπ ϕ λ= − −∫                              (2) 
In addition, for the purpose of tractability, the linear expenditure to maintain and the linear cost 
function is employed in the above model. The linear transportation cost is employed throughout this 
work. The results of this paper can be extended to situations without extreme curvature. The following 
notes are presented, which are satisfied in the above model. Noticeably, (1) indicates 
1 1
1 20
( , ) ( , )t tTd A p c t dt c x z c t dt x z
λ λ
ϕ λ ϕ λ
− −
= − − − − − −∫ ∫ , which is the first-optimal condition 
of (1).  
Note 1 Because 
2
2





, ( , , )u d T x  is concave and twice differentiable in d , it guarantees 
the existence of a unique solution for the consumer. Furthermore, 





 and ( , , ) 0d p T x >  
for all x  because A  is large enough. 
 
Note 2 Because ( , , ) 0d p T x > , 
1
0
( , ) ( , , )D p T d p T x d x= ∫  yields ( , ) 0D p T >  for all p and T . 
Note 3 From 
1 1
1 20
( , ) ( , )t tTd A p c t dt c x z c t dt x z
λ λ
ϕ λ ϕ λ
− −
= − − − − − −∫ ∫ , we obtain that ( )pπ  is 
concave and twice differentiable in p , which guarantees the existence of a unique solution for the 
above model. 
Notes 1 and 3 demonstrate the existence of the unique solution to the above problem. Note 2 
guarantees that the consumer consumes a positive quantity in the equilibrium state. If A  is large 
enough, Notes 1 and 2 are met. The model is the extension of maintenance commitment of Nie (2010) 
to spatial competition. Furthermore, market clearing conditions, ( , )q D p T= , always satisfy this cha-
racteristic because of monopolization.    
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3. MAIN RESULTS 
We first focus on the demand based on (1). The equilibrium, including price and guarantee time limit, 
is then discussed.  
3.1 DEMAND 
Here, we capture the solution of (1) , ( , , )d p T x and 
1
0
( , ) ( , , )D p T d p T x d x= ∫  with comparative static 
analysis. We hope to grasp the features if p and T  change. For the above model (1)-(2), the following 
conclusions about the demand functions are established. 
Proposition 1 The demand function of the consumers satisfies the relationship 




∂  and 






Proof: See Appendix.    ■ 
Remark: Conclusions in Proposition 1 illustrate that both lower price and longer guarantee time 
limits significantly increase demand, which is consistent with existing evidence (Nie, 2010). 




∂  is also the classic conclusion in economics.  
Furthermore, according to (1), if the incurred transportation cost is entirely undertaken by consum-






∂ . This indicates that lower marginal transportation cost leads to 
higher demand. Further, lower marginal transportation cost improves the consumers’ utility.  
The utility function of consumers is then addressed. When guarantee time limit changes, we hope 
to acknowledge the consumers’ utility. Using the envelope theorem, consumer utility is discussed and 














Proof: See in Appendix.    ■ 
Remark: The above conclusions describe the relationship between the utility function and va-
riables tc and T . The conclusions in Propositions 1 and 2 simultaneously hold in the general hypothe-
sis satisfying Notes 1 and 2. Longer guarantee time limit, higher utility of consumers and higher mar-
ginal transportation costs reduce consumers’ utility.  
Furthermore, we assert that the explicit function of demand meets  
1 1
1 20
( , ) ( , ) 0t tT
u A q p c t dt c x z c t dt x z
q
λ λ
ϕ λ ϕ λ
− −∂
= − − − − − − − =
∂ ∫ ∫ ,     (3) 
1 1
1 20
( , , ) ( , ) ( , )t tTd p T x A p c t dt c x z c t dt x z
λ λ
ϕ λ ϕ λ
− −
= − − − − − −∫ ∫ .      (4) 
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x z dx z z− = − +∫ . The fol-






1 20 0 0
2 2
1 1 2 20
( , ) ( , , )
( , ) ( , )




D p T d p T x d x
A p c t dt c x z dx c t dt x z dx
A p c t dt c z z c t dt z z
λ λ
λ λ
ϕ λ ϕ λ




= − − − − − −
= − − − − + − − +
∫
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
∫ ∫
    (5) 
   We further have the relation 









( , )c Tϕ λ= , 
1
2 2
1 1 2 20
( , ) 1 1( ) ( , ) ( ) 0
2 2t





= − − + − − + <
∂ ∫ , 11
( , ) (1 2 )t








( , ) ( , ) (1 2 )t






∂ ∫ . The following analyses are all based on these formulations.  
3.2 EQUILIBRIUM 
The equilibrium price and guarantee time limit are addressed. The model is analyzed by backward 
induction technology. The second stage is considered first. By virtue of market clearing conditions, 
( , )q D p T= , the profit function of the monopolist is  
00
max ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ).
T
p
p p D p T cD p T t d t c D p Tπ ϕ λ= − −∫        (6) 
According to (6), the profit function is concave and Note 3 is satisfied, which guarantees the exis-
tence and unique solution. The solution is determined by the first-order optimal condition of ( )pπ as 
follows: 
00
( , ) ( , )( , ) [ ( , ) ] 0





= + − + =




1 1 2 2 00 0




A p c t dt c z z c t dt z z p c t dt c
λ λ
ϕ λ ϕ λ ϕ λ
− −
− − − − + − − + − + + =∫ ∫ ∫ . 
We therefore achieve the optimal price of the monopolist.  
1 1
2 2
1 1 2 2 00 0*





A c t dt c z z c t dt z z c t dt c
p
λ λ
ϕ λ ϕ λ ϕ λ
− −
− − − + − − + + +
=
∫ ∫ ∫ .   (8) 
The corresponding profits are  
* * * * *
00
( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ).
T
p p D p T cD p T t d t c D p Tπ ϕ λ= − −∫                            (9) 
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For the optimal price and the corresponding profits, by virtue of comparative static analysis and the 
envelope theorem, the following conclusion holds. 



























( , ) (1 2 )
2












Proof: See in Appendix.    ■ 
Remark: in the above demonstration, higher marginal transportation costs lower the price and 
profit of the firm. Longer guarantee time limit is associated with higher price, which is consistent with 

















( , ) (1 2 )
0 0.52





= − < >∂ 
∫ , the monopolist's prices are highest when 1 2 0.5z z= = . 
Therefore, when location is closer to the middle point, the price increases under equilibrium price. 
When a firm’s location and repairing location are both close to the middle point, demand improves 
and the monopolist benefits from this location. 
We further discuss guarantee limit time T . According to the envelope theorem, the following rela-












( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , )[ ( , ) ] ( , ) ( , )
[ ( , ) ( , )] ( , )
T
T
p D p T cD p T T
T p T D T
D p Tp c t dt c cD p T T
T
p c t dt c D p T c T
π π π
ϕ λ
ϕ λ ϕ λ
ϕ λ ϕ λ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂
= − − −
∂
= − − −
∫
∫
.                  (10) 
 
This analysis is summarized as follows: 
Proposition 4  For profit function, if * *00 ( , ) ( , ) 0
T











Remarks: The conclusion in the above proposition illustrates the relationship between the longer 
guarantee limit time and the firm’s profits. If * *00 ( , ) ( , ) 0
T
p c t dt c D p Tϕ λ− − − >∫ or the demand is 
small, the firm is apt to longer guarantee a time limit. Otherwise, a longer guarantee time limit reduces 
the firm’s profits. 
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The first stage is then discussed and the optimal location is focused on. The formula-
tion  indicates that ( , )D p T  should obtain its maximization values at 1
1
2









∂  also suggests that 
p should achieve its maximization at 1
1
2
z = . We therefore make 
the conclusion that * * * 00( ) ( , )[ ( , ) ]
T
p D p T p c t dt cπ ϕ λ= − −∫  reaches its maximization at 1
1
2
z = . 
Similarly, * * * 00( ) ( , )[ ( , ) ]
T
p D p T p c t dt cπ ϕ λ= − −∫  obtains its maximization at 2
1
2
z = . The above 
analysis on the first stage is summarized as follows: 
 Proposition 5 Under uniform distribution of consumers, the optimal location of both 
sale and maintenance is the middle point of a linear city. 
 The two stage model is addressed and the optimal price and location for the monopolist 
are achieved. The above conclusions are useful for firms that are making location and price decisions. 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this work, the theory of goods requiring high maintenance expenditure under spatial competi-
tion is developed for monopoly conditions, and the corresponding results are established. The optimal 
location and guarantee maintenance patterns are analyzed and compared. To our surprise, the optimal 
location is at the exact middle point of a linear city. To our knowledge, there exists no literature about 
spatial competitions on maintenance commitment; this study is the first to addresses this topic. 
In this work, shipping costs are shouldered by consumers. If part of this cost is undertaken by the 
firm, similar techniques are adopted and the corresponding conclusions are achieved. The uniform 
distribution of consumers is discussed in this work and can be extended to general situations. This 
paper focuses on rational consumers, while, in many industries, shipping costs may be neglected ac-
cording to experiments in behavioral economics (Hossain and Morgan, 2006). In summary, the con-
sumers' nonstandard decision regarding shipping costs is a complex topic and will be the focus of our 
future research. 
This paper assumes that complete information about the product is known to both producer and 
consumers. Incomplete information renders modeling more difficult and will be the subject of our fu-
ture research. 
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Proof of Proposition 1 
We first discuss ( , , )d p T x , which is the solution to the first optimal conditions of (1). Then, 
1
0
( , ) ( , , )D p T d p T x d x= ∫  is addressed. ( , , )d p T x  is the solution of (1) and the first order optimal 
conditions of (1) are outlined as follows: 
1 1
1 20
( , , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0t tT
u q T xf A q p c t dt c x z c t dt x z
q
λ λ
ϕ λ ϕ λ
− −∂
= = − − − − − − − =
∂ ∫ ∫ . 




= − = −







. According to the implicit 
function theorem, there exists the unique explicit function ( , , )d p T x , which is differentiable and the 
following relationships hold. 
( , , ) 1 0
f










( , , ) 0
f












( , ) ( , , )D p T d p T x d x= ∫  and ( , , )d p T x  is continuously differentiable, we achieve the re-
lationship 




∂  and 
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Our conclusions are achieved and the proof is complete. We further point out that we can directly 
employ the comparative static analysis approach to obtain the above results. In general cases, the im-
plicit function theorem seems to be more powerful that the comparative static analysis approach.  ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
We demonstrate the conclusions using the envelope theorem.  
( , ) 0u u d u cq T
T d T T
ϕ λ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + = >





( , ) 0
t t t
u u d u q x z q t d tx z
c d c c
λ
ϕ λ
−∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + = − − − − <
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∫ . 
Our results are obtained and the proof is complete. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
We demonstrate  this with comparative static analysis method. By virtue of (8), the comparative static 
analysis approach indicates the formulations 
*









* 1 1 2 20
1 1( ) ( , ) ( )
2 2 0
2t





− − + − − +∂
= <
∂












( , ) (1 2 )
2






∂ ∫ . 










[ ( , ) ] 0
T
t t t t t
p D D Dp c t dt c
c p c D c D c c
π π π π
ϕ λ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + = = − − >
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∫ . 
Our results are obtained and the proof is complete. ■ 
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MONOPOL NAD ROBOM S PROSTORNIM ODRŽAVANJEM 
SAŽETAK 
Ovaj rad se bavi efektima koje lokacija i vremensko ograničenje garancije u monopolističkim tvrtka-
ma imaju na formiranje cijena robe koja zahtijeva visoke troškove održavanja, kao što su liftovi, tele-
vizori i kompjuteri. U ovom radu iznosimo model prostornog održavanja u dva stupnja unutar garan-
tiranog vremenskog ograničenja. Na osnovu ovog modela, lokacija, obveza održavanja i formiranje 
cijena se sve određuju u situaciji monopola. Rad donosi optimalne cijene i lokacije za monopolistu. 
Raspravlja se i o učincima vremenskog ograničenja garancije na cijenu. 
 
Ključne riječi: Struktura tržišta, obveza prostornog održavanja, vremensko ograničenje garancije, 
teorija igara, monopol 
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